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Diffstat (limited to 'libtdenetwork/libgpgme-copy/gpgme/keylist.c')
-rw-r--r--libtdenetwork/libgpgme-copy/gpgme/keylist.c980
1 files changed, 980 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/libtdenetwork/libgpgme-copy/gpgme/keylist.c b/libtdenetwork/libgpgme-copy/gpgme/keylist.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..442409bef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/libtdenetwork/libgpgme-copy/gpgme/keylist.c
@@ -0,0 +1,980 @@
+/* keylist.c - Listing keys.
+ Copyright (C) 2000 Werner Koch (dd9jn)
+ Copyright (C) 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2006 g10 Code GmbH
+
+ This file is part of GPGME.
+
+ GPGME is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as
+ published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of
+ the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+
+ GPGME is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
+ Lesser General Public License for more details.
+
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ License along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA
+ 02110-1301, USA. */
+
+#if HAVE_CONFIG_H
+#include <config.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include "gpgme.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include "context.h"
+#include "ops.h"
+#include "debug.h"
+
+
+struct key_queue_item_s
+{
+ struct key_queue_item_s *next;
+ gpgme_key_t key;
+};
+
+typedef struct
+{
+ struct _gpgme_op_keylist_result result;
+
+ gpgme_key_t tmp_key;
+
+ /* This points to the last uid in tmp_key. */
+ gpgme_user_id_t tmp_uid;
+
+ /* This points to the last sig in tmp_uid. */
+ gpgme_key_sig_t tmp_keysig;
+
+ /* Something new is available. */
+ int key_cond;
+ struct key_queue_item_s *key_queue;
+} *op_data_t;
+
+
+static void
+release_op_data (void *hook)
+{
+ op_data_t opd = (op_data_t) hook;
+ struct key_queue_item_s *key = opd->key_queue;
+
+ if (opd->tmp_key)
+ gpgme_key_unref (opd->tmp_key);
+
+ /* opd->tmp_uid and opd->tmp_keysig are actually part of opd->tmp_key,
+ so we do not need to release them here. */
+
+ while (key)
+ {
+ struct key_queue_item_s *next = key->next;
+
+ gpgme_key_unref (key->key);
+ key = next;
+ }
+}
+
+
+gpgme_keylist_result_t
+gpgme_op_keylist_result (gpgme_ctx_t ctx)
+{
+ void *hook;
+ op_data_t opd;
+ gpgme_error_t err;
+
+ err = _gpgme_op_data_lookup (ctx, OPDATA_KEYLIST, &hook, -1, NULL);
+ opd = hook;
+ if (err || !opd)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return &opd->result;
+}
+
+
+static gpgme_error_t
+keylist_status_handler (void *priv, gpgme_status_code_t code, char *args)
+{
+ gpgme_ctx_t ctx = (gpgme_ctx_t) priv;
+ gpgme_error_t err;
+ void *hook;
+ op_data_t opd;
+
+ err = _gpgme_op_data_lookup (ctx, OPDATA_KEYLIST, &hook, -1, NULL);
+ opd = hook;
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ switch (code)
+ {
+ case GPGME_STATUS_TRUNCATED:
+ opd->result.truncated = 1;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+static void
+set_subkey_trust_info (gpgme_subkey_t subkey, const char *src)
+{
+ while (*src && !isdigit (*src))
+ {
+ switch (*src)
+ {
+ case 'e':
+ subkey->expired = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case 'r':
+ subkey->revoked = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case 'd':
+ /* Note that gpg 1.3 won't print that anymore but only uses
+ the capabilities field. */
+ subkey->disabled = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case 'i':
+ subkey->invalid = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ src++;
+ }
+}
+
+
+static void
+set_mainkey_trust_info (gpgme_key_t key, const char *src)
+{
+ /* First set the trust info of the main key (the first subkey). */
+ set_subkey_trust_info (key->subkeys, src);
+
+ /* Now set the summarized trust info. */
+ while (*src && !isdigit (*src))
+ {
+ switch (*src)
+ {
+ case 'e':
+ key->expired = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case 'r':
+ key->revoked = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case 'd':
+ /* Note that gpg 1.3 won't print that anymore but only uses
+ the capabilities field. However, it is still used for
+ external key listings. */
+ key->disabled = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case 'i':
+ key->invalid = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ src++;
+ }
+}
+
+
+static void
+set_userid_flags (gpgme_key_t key, const char *src)
+{
+ gpgme_user_id_t uid = key->_last_uid;
+
+ assert (uid);
+ /* Look at letters and stop at the first digit. */
+ while (*src && !isdigit (*src))
+ {
+ switch (*src)
+ {
+ case 'r':
+ uid->revoked = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case 'i':
+ uid->invalid = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case 'n':
+ uid->validity = GPGME_VALIDITY_NEVER;
+ break;
+
+ case 'm':
+ uid->validity = GPGME_VALIDITY_MARGINAL;
+ break;
+
+ case 'f':
+ uid->validity = GPGME_VALIDITY_FULL;
+ break;
+
+ case 'u':
+ uid->validity = GPGME_VALIDITY_ULTIMATE;
+ break;
+ }
+ src++;
+ }
+}
+
+
+static void
+set_subkey_capability (gpgme_subkey_t subkey, const char *src)
+{
+ while (*src)
+ {
+ switch (*src)
+ {
+ case 'e':
+ subkey->can_encrypt = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case 's':
+ subkey->can_sign = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case 'c':
+ subkey->can_certify = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case 'a':
+ subkey->can_authenticate = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case 'q':
+ subkey->is_qualified = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case 'd':
+ subkey->disabled = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ src++;
+ }
+}
+
+
+static void
+set_mainkey_capability (gpgme_key_t key, const char *src)
+{
+ /* First set the capabilities of the main key (the first subkey). */
+ set_subkey_capability (key->subkeys, src);
+
+ while (*src)
+ {
+ switch (*src)
+ {
+ case 'd':
+ case 'D':
+ /* Note, that this flag is also set using the key validity
+ field for backward compatibility with gpg 1.2. We use d
+ and D, so that a future gpg version will be able to
+ disable certain subkeys. Currently it is expected that
+ gpg sets this for the primary key. */
+ key->disabled = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case 'e':
+ case 'E':
+ key->can_encrypt = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case 's':
+ case 'S':
+ key->can_sign = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case 'c':
+ case 'C':
+ key->can_certify = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case 'a':
+ case 'A':
+ key->can_authenticate = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case 'q':
+ case 'Q':
+ key->is_qualified = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ src++;
+ }
+}
+
+
+static void
+set_ownertrust (gpgme_key_t key, const char *src)
+{
+ /* Look at letters and stop at the first digit. */
+ while (*src && !isdigit (*src))
+ {
+ switch (*src)
+ {
+ case 'n':
+ key->owner_trust = GPGME_VALIDITY_NEVER;
+ break;
+
+ case 'm':
+ key->owner_trust = GPGME_VALIDITY_MARGINAL;
+ break;
+
+ case 'f':
+ key->owner_trust = GPGME_VALIDITY_FULL;
+ break;
+
+ case 'u':
+ key->owner_trust = GPGME_VALIDITY_ULTIMATE;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ key->owner_trust = GPGME_VALIDITY_UNKNOWN;
+ break;
+ }
+ src++;
+ }
+}
+
+
+/* We have read an entire key into tmp_key and should now finish it.
+ It is assumed that this releases tmp_key. */
+static void
+finish_key (gpgme_ctx_t ctx, op_data_t opd)
+{
+ gpgme_key_t key = opd->tmp_key;
+
+ opd->tmp_key = NULL;
+ opd->tmp_uid = NULL;
+ opd->tmp_keysig = NULL;
+
+ if (key)
+ _gpgme_engine_io_event (ctx->engine, GPGME_EVENT_NEXT_KEY, key);
+}
+
+
+/* Note: We are allowed to modify LINE. */
+static gpgme_error_t
+keylist_colon_handler (void *priv, char *line)
+{
+ gpgme_ctx_t ctx = (gpgme_ctx_t) priv;
+ enum
+ {
+ RT_NONE, RT_SIG, RT_UID, RT_SUB, RT_PUB, RT_FPR,
+ RT_SSB, RT_SEC, RT_CRT, RT_CRS, RT_REV, RT_SPK
+ }
+ rectype = RT_NONE;
+#define NR_FIELDS 16
+ char *field[NR_FIELDS];
+ int fields = 0;
+ void *hook;
+ op_data_t opd;
+ gpgme_error_t err;
+ gpgme_key_t key;
+ gpgme_subkey_t subkey = NULL;
+ gpgme_key_sig_t keysig = NULL;
+
+ err = _gpgme_op_data_lookup (ctx, OPDATA_KEYLIST, &hook, -1, NULL);
+ opd = hook;
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ key = opd->tmp_key;
+
+ DEBUG3 ("keylist_colon_handler ctx = %p, key = %p, line = %s\n",
+ ctx, key, line ? line : "(null)");
+
+ if (!line)
+ {
+ /* End Of File. */
+ finish_key (ctx, opd);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ while (line && fields < NR_FIELDS)
+ {
+ field[fields++] = line;
+ line = strchr (line, ':');
+ if (line)
+ *(line++) = '\0';
+ }
+
+ if (!strcmp (field[0], "sig"))
+ rectype = RT_SIG;
+ else if (!strcmp (field[0], "rev"))
+ rectype = RT_REV;
+ else if (!strcmp (field[0], "pub"))
+ rectype = RT_PUB;
+ else if (!strcmp (field[0], "sec"))
+ rectype = RT_SEC;
+ else if (!strcmp (field[0], "crt"))
+ rectype = RT_CRT;
+ else if (!strcmp (field[0], "crs"))
+ rectype = RT_CRS;
+ else if (!strcmp (field[0], "fpr") && key)
+ rectype = RT_FPR;
+ else if (!strcmp (field[0], "uid") && key)
+ rectype = RT_UID;
+ else if (!strcmp (field[0], "sub") && key)
+ rectype = RT_SUB;
+ else if (!strcmp (field[0], "ssb") && key)
+ rectype = RT_SSB;
+ else if (!strcmp (field[0], "spk") && key)
+ rectype = RT_SPK;
+ else
+ rectype = RT_NONE;
+
+ /* Only look at signatures immediately following a user ID. For
+ this, clear the user ID pointer when encountering anything but a
+ signature. */
+ if (rectype != RT_SIG && rectype != RT_REV)
+ opd->tmp_uid = NULL;
+
+ /* Only look at subpackets immediately following a signature. For
+ this, clear the signature pointer when encountering anything but
+ a subpacket. */
+ if (rectype != RT_SPK)
+ opd->tmp_keysig = NULL;
+
+ switch (rectype)
+ {
+ case RT_PUB:
+ case RT_SEC:
+ case RT_CRT:
+ case RT_CRS:
+ /* Start a new keyblock. */
+ err = _gpgme_key_new (&key);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ key->keylist_mode = ctx->keylist_mode;
+ err = _gpgme_key_add_subkey (key, &subkey);
+ if (err)
+ {
+ gpgme_key_unref (key);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ if (rectype == RT_SEC || rectype == RT_CRS)
+ key->secret = subkey->secret = 1;
+ if (rectype == RT_CRT || rectype == RT_CRS)
+ key->protocol = GPGME_PROTOCOL_CMS;
+ finish_key (ctx, opd);
+ opd->tmp_key = key;
+
+ /* Field 2 has the trust info. */
+ if (fields >= 2)
+ set_mainkey_trust_info (key, field[1]);
+
+ /* Field 3 has the key length. */
+ if (fields >= 3)
+ {
+ int i = atoi (field[2]);
+ /* Ignore invalid values. */
+ if (i > 1)
+ subkey->length = i;
+ }
+
+ /* Field 4 has the public key algorithm. */
+ if (fields >= 4)
+ {
+ int i = atoi (field[3]);
+ if (i >= 1 && i < 128)
+ subkey->pubkey_algo = i;
+ }
+
+ /* Field 5 has the long keyid. Allow short key IDs for the
+ output of an external keyserver listing. */
+ if (fields >= 5 && strlen (field[4]) <= DIM(subkey->_keyid) - 1)
+ strcpy (subkey->_keyid, field[4]);
+
+ /* Field 6 has the timestamp (seconds). */
+ if (fields >= 6)
+ subkey->timestamp = _gpgme_parse_timestamp (field[5], NULL);
+
+ /* Field 7 has the expiration time (seconds). */
+ if (fields >= 7)
+ subkey->expires = _gpgme_parse_timestamp (field[6], NULL);
+
+ /* Field 8 has the X.509 serial number. */
+ if (fields >= 8 && (rectype == RT_CRT || rectype == RT_CRS))
+ {
+ key->issuer_serial = strdup (field[7]);
+ if (!key->issuer_serial)
+ return gpg_error_from_errno (errno);
+ }
+
+ /* Field 9 has the ownertrust. */
+ if (fields >= 9)
+ set_ownertrust (key, field[8]);
+
+ /* Field 10 is not used for gpg due to --fixed-list-mode option
+ but GPGSM stores the issuer name. */
+ if (fields >= 10 && (rectype == RT_CRT || rectype == RT_CRS))
+ if (_gpgme_decode_c_string (field[9], &key->issuer_name, 0))
+ return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ENOMEM); /* FIXME */
+
+ /* Field 11 has the signature class. */
+
+ /* Field 12 has the capabilities. */
+ if (fields >= 12)
+ set_mainkey_capability (key, field[11]);
+
+ /* Field 15 carries special flags of a secret key. We reset the
+ SECRET flag of a subkey here if the key is actually only a
+ stub. The SECRET flag of the key will be true even then. */
+ if (fields >= 15 && key->secret)
+ if (*field[14] == '#')
+ subkey->secret = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case RT_SUB:
+ case RT_SSB:
+ /* Start a new subkey. */
+ err = _gpgme_key_add_subkey (key, &subkey);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ if (rectype == RT_SSB)
+ subkey->secret = 1;
+
+ /* Field 2 has the trust info. */
+ if (fields >= 2)
+ set_subkey_trust_info (subkey, field[1]);
+
+ /* Field 3 has the key length. */
+ if (fields >= 3)
+ {
+ int i = atoi (field[2]);
+ /* Ignore invalid values. */
+ if (i > 1)
+ subkey->length = i;
+ }
+
+ /* Field 4 has the public key algorithm. */
+ if (fields >= 4)
+ {
+ int i = atoi (field[3]);
+ if (i >= 1 && i < 128)
+ subkey->pubkey_algo = i;
+ }
+
+ /* Field 5 has the long keyid. */
+ if (fields >= 5 && strlen (field[4]) == DIM(subkey->_keyid) - 1)
+ strcpy (subkey->_keyid, field[4]);
+
+ /* Field 6 has the timestamp (seconds). */
+ if (fields >= 6)
+ subkey->timestamp = _gpgme_parse_timestamp (field[5], NULL);
+
+ /* Field 7 has the expiration time (seconds). */
+ if (fields >= 7)
+ subkey->expires = _gpgme_parse_timestamp (field[6], NULL);
+
+ /* Field 8 is reserved (LID). */
+ /* Field 9 has the ownertrust. */
+ /* Field 10, the user ID, is n/a for a subkey. */
+
+ /* Field 11 has the signature class. */
+
+ /* Field 12 has the capabilities. */
+ if (fields >= 12)
+ set_subkey_capability (subkey, field[11]);
+
+ /* Field 15 carries special flags of a secret key. */
+ if (fields >= 15 && key->secret)
+ if (*field[14] == '#')
+ subkey->secret = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case RT_UID:
+ /* Field 2 has the trust info, and field 10 has the user ID. */
+ if (fields >= 10)
+ {
+ if (_gpgme_key_append_name (key, field[9]))
+ return gpg_error_from_errno (GPG_ERR_ENOMEM); /* FIXME */
+ else
+ {
+ if (field[1])
+ set_userid_flags (key, field[1]);
+ opd->tmp_uid = key->_last_uid;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case RT_FPR:
+ /* Field 10 has the fingerprint (take only the first one). */
+ if (fields >= 10 && field[9] && *field[9])
+ {
+ /* Need to apply it to the last subkey because all subkeys
+ do have fingerprints. */
+ subkey = key->_last_subkey;
+ if (!subkey->fpr)
+ {
+ subkey->fpr = strdup (field[9]);
+ if (!subkey->fpr)
+ return gpg_error_from_errno (errno);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Field 13 has the gpgsm chain ID (take only the first one). */
+ if (fields >= 13 && !key->chain_id && *field[12])
+ {
+ key->chain_id = strdup (field[12]);
+ if (!key->chain_id)
+ return gpg_error_from_errno (errno);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case RT_SIG:
+ case RT_REV:
+ if (!opd->tmp_uid)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Start a new (revoked) signature. */
+ assert (opd->tmp_uid == key->_last_uid);
+ keysig = _gpgme_key_add_sig (key, (fields >= 10) ? field[9] : NULL);
+ if (!keysig)
+ return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ENOMEM); /* FIXME */
+
+ /* Field 2 has the calculated trust ('!', '-', '?', '%'). */
+ if (fields >= 2)
+ switch (field[1][0])
+ {
+ case '!':
+ keysig->status = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR);
+ break;
+
+ case '-':
+ keysig->status = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ break;
+
+ case '?':
+ keysig->status = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY);
+ break;
+
+ case '%':
+ keysig->status = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ keysig->status = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Field 4 has the public key algorithm. */
+ if (fields >= 4)
+ {
+ int i = atoi (field[3]);
+ if (i >= 1 && i < 128)
+ keysig->pubkey_algo = i;
+ }
+
+ /* Field 5 has the long keyid. */
+ if (fields >= 5 && strlen (field[4]) == DIM(keysig->_keyid) - 1)
+ strcpy (keysig->_keyid, field[4]);
+
+ /* Field 6 has the timestamp (seconds). */
+ if (fields >= 6)
+ keysig->timestamp = _gpgme_parse_timestamp (field[5], NULL);
+
+ /* Field 7 has the expiration time (seconds). */
+ if (fields >= 7)
+ keysig->expires = _gpgme_parse_timestamp (field[6], NULL);
+
+ /* Field 11 has the signature class (eg, 0x30 means revoked). */
+ if (fields >= 11)
+ if (field[10][0] && field[10][1])
+ {
+ int sig_class = _gpgme_hextobyte (field[10]);
+ if (sig_class >= 0)
+ {
+ keysig->sig_class = sig_class;
+ keysig->class = keysig->sig_class;
+ if (sig_class == 0x30)
+ keysig->revoked = 1;
+ }
+ if (field[10][2] == 'x')
+ keysig->exportable = 1;
+ }
+
+ opd->tmp_keysig = keysig;
+ break;
+
+ case RT_SPK:
+ if (!opd->tmp_keysig)
+ return 0;
+ assert (opd->tmp_keysig == key->_last_uid->_last_keysig);
+
+ if (fields >= 4)
+ {
+ /* Field 2 has the subpacket type. */
+ int type = atoi (field[1]);
+
+ /* Field 3 has the flags. */
+ int flags = atoi (field[2]);
+
+ /* Field 4 has the length. */
+ int len = atoi (field[3]);
+
+ /* Field 5 has the data. */
+ char *data = field[4];
+
+ /* Type 20: Notation data. */
+ /* Type 26: Policy URL. */
+ if (type == 20 || type == 26)
+ {
+ gpgme_sig_notation_t notation;
+
+ keysig = opd->tmp_keysig;
+
+ /* At this time, any error is serious. */
+ err = _gpgme_parse_notation (&notation, type, flags, len, data);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* Add a new notation. FIXME: Could be factored out. */
+ if (!keysig->notations)
+ keysig->notations = notation;
+ if (keysig->_last_notation)
+ keysig->_last_notation->next = notation;
+ keysig->_last_notation = notation;
+ }
+ }
+
+ case RT_NONE:
+ /* Unknown record. */
+ break;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+void
+_gpgme_op_keylist_event_cb (void *data, gpgme_event_io_t type, void *type_data)
+{
+ gpgme_error_t err;
+ gpgme_ctx_t ctx = (gpgme_ctx_t) data;
+ gpgme_key_t key = (gpgme_key_t) type_data;
+ void *hook;
+ op_data_t opd;
+ struct key_queue_item_s *q, *q2;
+
+ assert (type == GPGME_EVENT_NEXT_KEY);
+
+ err = _gpgme_op_data_lookup (ctx, OPDATA_KEYLIST, &hook, -1, NULL);
+ opd = hook;
+ if (err)
+ return;
+
+ q = malloc (sizeof *q);
+ if (!q)
+ {
+ gpgme_key_unref (key);
+ /* FIXME return GPGME_Out_Of_Core; */
+ return;
+ }
+ q->key = key;
+ q->next = NULL;
+ /* FIXME: Use a tail pointer? */
+ if (!(q2 = opd->key_queue))
+ opd->key_queue = q;
+ else
+ {
+ for (; q2->next; q2 = q2->next)
+ ;
+ q2->next = q;
+ }
+ opd->key_cond = 1;
+}
+
+
+/* Start a keylist operation within CTX, searching for keys which
+ match PATTERN. If SECRET_ONLY is true, only secret keys are
+ returned. */
+gpgme_error_t
+gpgme_op_keylist_start (gpgme_ctx_t ctx, const char *pattern, int secret_only)
+{
+ gpgme_error_t err;
+ void *hook;
+ op_data_t opd;
+
+ err = _gpgme_op_reset (ctx, 2);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ err = _gpgme_op_data_lookup (ctx, OPDATA_KEYLIST, &hook,
+ sizeof (*opd), release_op_data);
+ opd = hook;
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ _gpgme_engine_set_status_handler (ctx->engine, keylist_status_handler, ctx);
+
+ err = _gpgme_engine_set_colon_line_handler (ctx->engine,
+ keylist_colon_handler, ctx);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ return _gpgme_engine_op_keylist (ctx->engine, pattern, secret_only,
+ ctx->keylist_mode);
+}
+
+
+/* Start a keylist operation within CTX, searching for keys which
+ match PATTERN. If SECRET_ONLY is true, only secret keys are
+ returned. */
+gpgme_error_t
+gpgme_op_keylist_ext_start (gpgme_ctx_t ctx, const char *pattern[],
+ int secret_only, int reserved)
+{
+ gpgme_error_t err;
+ void *hook;
+ op_data_t opd;
+
+ err = _gpgme_op_reset (ctx, 2);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ err = _gpgme_op_data_lookup (ctx, OPDATA_KEYLIST, &hook,
+ sizeof (*opd), release_op_data);
+ opd = hook;
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ _gpgme_engine_set_status_handler (ctx->engine, keylist_status_handler, ctx);
+ err = _gpgme_engine_set_colon_line_handler (ctx->engine,
+ keylist_colon_handler, ctx);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ return _gpgme_engine_op_keylist_ext (ctx->engine, pattern, secret_only,
+ reserved, ctx->keylist_mode);
+}
+
+
+/* Return the next key from the keylist in R_KEY. */
+gpgme_error_t
+gpgme_op_keylist_next (gpgme_ctx_t ctx, gpgme_key_t *r_key)
+{
+ gpgme_error_t err;
+ struct key_queue_item_s *queue_item;
+ void *hook;
+ op_data_t opd;
+
+ if (!ctx || !r_key)
+ return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
+ *r_key = NULL;
+ if (!ctx)
+ return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
+
+ err = _gpgme_op_data_lookup (ctx, OPDATA_KEYLIST, &hook, -1, NULL);
+ opd = hook;
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ if (opd == NULL)
+ return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
+
+ if (!opd->key_queue)
+ {
+ err = _gpgme_wait_on_condition (ctx, &opd->key_cond);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ if (!opd->key_cond)
+ return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_EOF);
+
+ opd->key_cond = 0;
+ assert (opd->key_queue);
+ }
+ queue_item = opd->key_queue;
+ opd->key_queue = queue_item->next;
+ if (!opd->key_queue)
+ opd->key_cond = 0;
+
+ *r_key = queue_item->key;
+ free (queue_item);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+/* Terminate a pending keylist operation within CTX. */
+gpgme_error_t
+gpgme_op_keylist_end (gpgme_ctx_t ctx)
+{
+ if (!ctx)
+ return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+/* Get the key with the fingerprint FPR from the crypto backend. If
+ SECRET is true, get the secret key. */
+gpgme_error_t
+gpgme_get_key (gpgme_ctx_t ctx, const char *fpr, gpgme_key_t *r_key,
+ int secret)
+{
+ gpgme_ctx_t listctx;
+ gpgme_error_t err;
+ gpgme_key_t key;
+
+ if (!ctx || !r_key || !fpr)
+ return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
+
+ if (strlen (fpr) < 8) /* We have at least a key ID. */
+ return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
+
+ /* FIXME: We use our own context because we have to avoid the user's
+ I/O callback handlers. */
+ err = gpgme_new (&listctx);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ {
+ gpgme_protocol_t proto;
+ gpgme_engine_info_t info;
+
+ /* Clone the relevant state. */
+ proto = gpgme_get_protocol (ctx);
+ gpgme_set_protocol (listctx, proto);
+ gpgme_set_keylist_mode (listctx, gpgme_get_keylist_mode (ctx));
+ info = gpgme_ctx_get_engine_info (ctx);
+ while (info && info->protocol != proto)
+ info = info->next;
+ if (info)
+ gpgme_ctx_set_engine_info (listctx, proto,
+ info->file_name, info->home_dir);
+ }
+
+ err = gpgme_op_keylist_start (listctx, fpr, secret);
+ if (!err)
+ err = gpgme_op_keylist_next (listctx, r_key);
+ if (!err)
+ {
+ err = gpgme_op_keylist_next (listctx, &key);
+ if (gpgme_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_EOF)
+ err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR);
+ else
+ {
+ if (!err)
+ {
+ gpgme_key_unref (key);
+ err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_AMBIGUOUS_NAME);
+ }
+ gpgme_key_unref (*r_key);
+ }
+ }
+ gpgme_release (listctx);
+ return err;
+}
generated by cgit v1.2.1 (git 2.18.0) at 2024-12-29 13:29:04 +0000