diff options
author | runge <runge> | 2006-06-03 20:49:09 +0000 |
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committer | runge <runge> | 2006-06-03 20:49:09 +0000 |
commit | 203eee7cfdb70556125f959d3b548fbd1213d8d2 (patch) | |
tree | d1da7e1014d58f2e7c44bda9b23652b4286a8887 /x11vnc/x11vnc.1 | |
parent | 8417618289bd95663789bb67d841800f166c57a0 (diff) | |
download | libtdevnc-203eee7cfdb70556125f959d3b548fbd1213d8d2.tar.gz libtdevnc-203eee7cfdb70556125f959d3b548fbd1213d8d2.zip |
x11vnc: -capslock -skip_lockkeys; Alt keys under -rawfb cons.
Diffstat (limited to 'x11vnc/x11vnc.1')
-rw-r--r-- | x11vnc/x11vnc.1 | 761 |
1 files changed, 62 insertions, 699 deletions
diff --git a/x11vnc/x11vnc.1 b/x11vnc/x11vnc.1 index cb232aa..c8490bc 100644 --- a/x11vnc/x11vnc.1 +++ b/x11vnc/x11vnc.1 @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ .\" This file was automatically generated from x11vnc -help output. -.TH X11VNC "1" "May 2006" "x11vnc " "User Commands" +.TH X11VNC "1" "June 2006" "x11vnc " "User Commands" .SH NAME x11vnc - allow VNC connections to real X11 displays - version: 0.8.1, lastmod: 2006-05-06 + version: 0.8.1, lastmod: 2006-06-03 .SH SYNOPSIS .B x11vnc [OPTION]... @@ -515,696 +515,6 @@ used to have viewonly passwords. (tip: make the 3rd and last line be "__BEGIN_VIEWONLY__" to have 2 full-access passwords) .PP -\fB-unixpw\fR \fI[list]\fR -.IP -Use Unix username and password authentication. x11vnc -uses the -.IR su (1) -program to verify the user's password. -[list] is an optional comma separated list of allowed -Unix usernames. See below for per-user options that -can be applied. -.IP -A familiar "login:" and "Password:" dialog is -presented to the user on a black screen inside the -vncviewer. The connection is dropped if the user fails -to supply the correct password in 3 tries or does not -send one before a 25 second timeout. Existing clients -are view-only during this period. -.IP -Since the detailed behavior of -.IR su (1) -can vary from -OS to OS and for local configurations, test the mode -carefully on your systems before using it in production. -Test different combinations of valid/invalid usernames -and valid/invalid passwords to see if it behaves as -expected. x11vnc will attempt to be conservative and -reject a login if anything abnormal occurs. -.IP -On FreeBSD and the other BSD's by default it is -impossible for the user running x11vnc to validate -his *own* password via -.IR su (1) -(evidently commenting out -the pam_self.so entry in /etc/pam.d/su eliminates this -problem). So the x11vnc login will always *fail* for -this case (even when the correct password is supplied). -.IP -A possible workaround for this would be to start -x11vnc as root with the "\fB-users\fR \fI+nobody\fR" option to -immediately switch to user nobody. Another source of -problems are PAM modules that prompt for extra info, -e.g. password aging modules. These logins will fail -as well even when the correct password is supplied. -.IP -**IMPORTANT**: to prevent the Unix password being sent -in *clear text* over the network, one of two schemes -will be enforced: 1) the \fB-ssl\fR builtin SSL mode, or 2) -require both \fB-localhost\fR and \fB-stunnel\fR be enabled. -.IP -Method 1) ensures the traffic is encrypted between -viewer and server. A PEM file will be required, see the -discussion under \fB-ssl\fR below (under some circumstances -a temporary one can be automatically generated). -.IP -Method 2) requires the viewer connection to appear -to come from the same machine x11vnc is running on -(e.g. from a ssh \fB-L\fR port redirection). And that the -\fB-stunnel\fR SSL mode be used for encryption over the -network.(see the description of \fB-stunnel\fR below). -.IP -Note: as a convenience, if you -.IR ssh (1) -in and start -x11vnc it will check if the environment variable -SSH_CONNECTION is set and appears reasonable. If it -does, then the \fB-ssl\fR or \fB-stunnel\fR requirement will be -dropped since it is assumed you are using ssh for the -encrypted tunnelling. \fB-localhost\fR is still enforced. -Use \fB-ssl\fR or \fB-stunnel\fR to force SSL usage even if -SSH_CONNECTION is set. -.IP -To override the above restrictions you can set -environment variables before starting x11vnc: -.IP -Set UNIXPW_DISABLE_SSL=1 to disable requiring either -\fB-ssl\fR or \fB-stunnel.\fR Evidently you will be using a -different method to encrypt the data between the -vncviewer and x11vnc: perhaps -.IR ssh (1) -or an IPSEC VPN. -.IP -Note that use of \fB-localhost\fR with -.IR ssh (1) -is roughly -the same as requiring a Unix user login (since a Unix -password or the user's public key authentication is -used by sshd on the machine where x11vnc runs and only -local connections from that machine are accepted) -.IP -Set UNIXPW_DISABLE_LOCALHOST=1 to disable the \fB-localhost\fR -requirement in Method 2). One should never do this -(i.e. allow the Unix passwords to be sniffed on the -network). -.IP -Regarding reverse connections (e.g. \fB-R\fR connect:host -and \fB-connect\fR host), when the \fB-localhost\fR constraint is -in effect then reverse connections can only be used -to connect to the same machine x11vnc is running on -(default port 5500). Please use a ssh or stunnel port -redirection to the viewer machine to tunnel the reverse -connection over an encrypted channel. Note that in \fB-ssl\fR -mode reverse connection are disabled (see below). -.IP -In \fB-inetd\fR mode the Method 1) will be enforced (not -Method 2). With \fB-ssl\fR in effect reverse connections -are disabled. If you override this via env. var, be -sure to also use encryption from the viewer to inetd. -Tip: you can also have your own stunnel spawn x11vnc -in \fB-inetd\fR mode (thereby bypassing inetd). See the FAQ -for details. -.IP -The user names in the comma separated [list] can have -per-user options after a ":", e.g. "fred:opts" -where "opts" is a "+" separated list of -"viewonly", "fullaccess", "input=XXXX", or -"deny", e.g. "karl,fred:viewonly,boss:input=M". -For "input=" it is the K,M,B,C described under \fB-input.\fR -.IP -If a user in the list is "*" that means those -options apply to all users. It also means all users -are allowed to log in after supplying a valid password. -Use "deny" to explicitly deny some users if you use -"*" to set a global option. -.IP -There are also some utilities for testing password -if [list] starts with the "%" character. See the -quick_pw() function in the source for details. -.PP -\fB-unixpw_nis\fR \fI[list]\fR -.IP -As \fB-unixpw\fR above, however do not use -.IR su (1) -but rather -use the traditional -.IR getpwnam (3) -+ -.IR crypt (3) -method to -verify passwords instead. This requires that the -encrypted passwords be readable. Passwords stored -in /etc/shadow will be inaccessible unless x11vnc -is run as root. -.IP -This is called "NIS" mode simply because in most -NIS setups the user encrypted passwords are accessible -(e.g. "ypcat passwd"). NIS is not required for this -mode to work (only that -.IR getpwnam (3) -return the encrypted -password is required), but it is unlikely it will work -for any other modern environment. All of the \fB-unixpw\fR -options and contraints apply. -.PP -\fB-ssl\fR \fI[pem]\fR -.IP -Use the openssl library (www.openssl.org) to provide a -built-in encrypted SSL tunnel between VNC viewers and -x11vnc. This requires libssl support to be compiled -into x11vnc at build time. If x11vnc is not built -with libssl support it will exit immediately when \fB-ssl\fR -is prescribed. -.IP -[pem] is optional, use "\fB-ssl\fR \fI/path/to/mycert.pem\fR" -to specify a PEM certificate file to use to identify -and provide a key for this server. See -.IR openssl (1) -for -more info about PEMs and the \fB-sslGenCert\fR option below. -.IP -The connecting VNC viewer SSL tunnel can optionally -authenticate this server if they have the public -key part of the certificate (or a common certificate -authority, CA, is a more sophisicated way to verify -this server's cert, see \fB-sslGenCA\fR below). This is -used to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. Otherwise, -if the VNC viewer accepts this server's key without -verification, at least the traffic is protected -from passive sniffing on the network (but NOT from -man-in-the-middle attacks). -.IP -If [pem] is not supplied and the -.IR openssl (1) -utility -command exists in PATH, then a temporary, self-signed -certificate will be generated for this session (this -may take 5-30 seconds on slow machines). If -.IR openssl (1) -cannot be used to generate a temporary certificate -x11vnc exits immediately. -.IP -If successful in using -.IR openssl (1) -to generate a -temporary certificate, the public part of it will be -displayed to stderr (e.g. one could copy it to the -client-side to provide authentication of the server to -VNC viewers.) See following paragraphs for how to save -keys to reuse when x11vnc is restarted. -.IP -Set the env. var. X11VNC_SHOW_TMP_PEM=1 to have x11vnc -print out the entire certificate, including the PRIVATE -KEY part, to stderr. One could reuse this cert if saved -in a [pem] file. Similarly, set X11VNC_KEEP_TMP_PEM=1 -to not delete the temporary PEM file: the file name -will be printed to stderr (so one could move it to -a safe place for reuse). You will be prompted for a -passphrase for the private key. -.IP -If [pem] is "SAVE" then the certificate will be saved -to the file ~/.vnc/certs/server.pem, or if that file -exists it will be used directly. Similarly, if [pem] -is "SAVE_PROMPT" the server.pem certificate will be -made based on your answers to its prompts for info such -as OrganizationalName, CommonName, etc. -.IP -Use "SAVE-<string>" and "SAVE_PROMPT-<string>" -to refer to the file ~/.vnc/certs/server-<string>.pem -instead. E.g. "SAVE-charlie" will store to the file -~/.vnc/certs/server-charlie.pem -.IP -See \fB-ssldir\fR below to use a directory besides the -default ~/.vnc/certs -.IP -Example: x11vnc \fB-ssl\fR SAVE \fB-display\fR :0 ... -.IP -Reverse connections are disabled in \fB-ssl\fR mode because -there is no way to ensure that data channel will -be encrypted. Set X11VNC_SSL_ALLOW_REVERSE=1 to -override this. -.IP -Your VNC viewer will also need to be able to connect -via SSL. See the discussion below under \fB-stunnel\fR and -the FAQ (ssl_vncviewer script) for how this might be -achieved. E.g. on Unix it is easy to write a shell -script that starts up stunnel and then vncviewer. -Also in the x11vnc source a SSL enabled Java VNC Viewer -applet is provided in the classes/ssl directory. -.PP -\fB-ssldir\fR \fI[dir]\fR -.IP -Use [dir] as an alternate ssl certificate and key -management toplevel directory. The default is -~/.vnc/certs -.IP -This directory is used to store server and other -certificates and keys and also other materials. E.g. in -the simplest case, "\fB-ssl\fR \fISAVE\fR" will store the x11vnc -server cert in [dir]/server.pem -.IP -Use of alternate directories via \fB-ssldir\fR allows you to -manage multiple VNC Certificate Authority (CA) keys. -Another use is if ~/.vnc/cert is on an NFS share you -might want your certificates and keys to be on a local -filesystem to prevent network snooping (for example -\fB-ssldir\fR /var/lib/x11vnc-certs). -.IP -\fB-ssldir\fR affects nearly all of the other \fB-ssl*\fR options, -e.g. \fB-ssl\fR SAVE, \fB-sslGenCert,\fR etc.. -.PP -\fB-sslverify\fR \fI[path]\fR -.IP -For either of the \fB-ssl\fR or \fB-stunnel\fR modes, use [path] -to provide certificates to authenticate incoming VNC -*Client* connections (normally only the server is -authenticated in SSL.) This can be used as a method -to replace standard password authentication of clients. -.IP -If [path] is a directory it contains the client (or CA) -certificates in separate files. If [path] is a file, -it contains multiple certificates. See special tokens -below. These correspond to the "CApath = dir" and -"CAfile = file" stunnel options. See the -.IR stunnel (8) -manpage for details. -.IP -Examples: -x11vnc \fB-ssl\fR \fB-sslverify\fR ~/my.pem -x11vnc \fB-ssl\fR \fB-sslverify\fR ~/my_pem_dir/ -.IP -Note that if [path] is a directory, it must contain -the certs in separate files named like <HASH>.0, where -the value of <HASH> is found by running the command -"openssl x509 \fB-hash\fR \fB-noout\fR \fB-in\fR file.crt". Evidently -one uses <HASH>.1 if there is a collision... -.IP -The the key-management utility "\fB-sslCertInfo\fR \fIHASHON\fR" -and "\fB-sslCertInfo\fR \fIHASHOFF\fR" will create/delete these -hashes for you automatically (via symlink) in the HASH -subdirs it manages. Then you can point \fB-sslverify\fR to -the HASH subdir. -.IP -Special tokens: in \fB-ssl\fR mode, if [path] is not a file or -a directory, it is taken as a comma separated list of -tokens that are interpreted as follows: -.IP -If a token is "CA" that means load the CA/cacert.pem -file from the ssl directory. If a token is "clients" -then all the files clients/*.crt in the ssl directory -are loaded. Otherwise the file clients/token.crt -is attempted to be loaded. As a kludge, use a token -like ../server-foo to load a server cert if you find -that necessary. -.IP -Use \fB-ssldir\fR to use a directory different from the -~/.vnc/certs default. -.IP -Note that if the "CA" cert is loaded you do not need -to load any of the certs that have been signed by it. -You will need to load any additional self-signed certs -however. -.IP -Examples: -x11vnc \fB-ssl\fR \fB-sslverify\fR CA -x11vnc \fB-ssl\fR \fB-sslverify\fR self:fred,self:jim -x11vnc \fB-ssl\fR \fB-sslverify\fR CA,clients -.IP -Usually "\fB-sslverify\fR \fICA\fR" is the most effective. -See the \fB-sslGenCA\fR and \fB-sslGenCert\fR options below for -how to set up and manage the CA framework. -.IP -NOTE: the following utilities, \fB-sslGenCA,\fR \fB-sslGenCert,\fR -\fB-sslEncKey,\fR and \fB-sslCertInfo\fR are provided for -completeness, but for casual usage they are overkill. -.IP -They provide VNC Certificate Authority (CA) key creation -and server / client key generation and signing. So they -provide a basic Public Key management framework for -VNC-ing with x11vnc. (note that they require -.IR openssl (1) -be installed on the system) -.IP -However, the simplest usage mode (where x11vnc -automatically generates its own, self-signed, temporary -key and the VNC viewers always accept it, e.g. accepting -via a dialog box) is probably safe enough for most -scenarios. CA management is not needed. -.IP -To protect against Man-In-The-Middle attacks the -simplest mode can be improved by using "\fB-ssl\fR \fISAVE\fR" -to have x11vnc create a longer term self-signed -certificate, and then (safely) copy the corresponding -public key cert to the desired client machines (care -must be taken the private key part is not stolen; -you will be prompted for a passphrase). -.IP -So keep in mind no CA key creation or management -(-sslGenCA and \fB-sslGenCert)\fR is needed for either of -the above two common usage modes. -.IP -One might want to use \fB-sslGenCA\fR and \fB-sslGenCert\fR -if you had a large number of VNC client and server -workstations. That way the administrator could generate -a single CA key with \fB-sslGenCA\fR and distribute its -certificate part to all of the workstations. -.IP -Next, he could create signed VNC server keys -(-sslGenCert server ...) for each workstation or user -that then x11vnc would use to authenticate itself to -any VNC client that has the CA cert. -.IP -Optionally, the admin could also make it so the -VNC clients themselves are authenticated to x11vnc -(-sslGenCert client ...) For this \fB-sslverify\fR would be -pointed to the CA cert (and/or self-signed certs). -.IP -x11vnc will be able to use all of these cert and -key files. On the VNC client side, they will need to -be "imported" somehow. Web browsers have "Manage -Certificates" actions as does the Java applet plugin -Control Panel. stunnel can also use these files (see -the ssl_vncviewer example script in the FAQ.) -.PP -\fB-sslGenCA\fR \fI[dir]\fR -.IP -Generate your own Certificate Authority private key, -certificate, and other files in directory [dir]. -.IP -If [dir] is not supplied, a \fB-ssldir\fR setting is used, -or otherwise ~/.vnc/certs is used. -.IP -This command also creates directories where server and -client certs and keys will be stored. The -.IR openssl (1) -program must be installed on the system and available -in PATH. -.IP -After the CA files and directories are created the -command exits; the VNC server is not run. -.IP -You will be prompted for information to put into the CA -certificate. The info does not have to be accurate just -as long as clients accept the cert for VNC connections. -You will also need to supply a passphrase of at least -4 characters for the CA private key. -.IP -Once you have generated the CA you can distribute -its certificate part, [dir]/CA/cacert.pem, to other -workstations where VNC viewers will be run. One will -need to "import" this certicate in the applications, -e.g. Web browser, Java applet plugin, stunnel, etc. -Next, you can create and sign keys using the CA with -the \fB-sslGenCert\fR option below. -.IP -Examples: -x11vnc \fB-sslGenCA\fR -x11vnc \fB-sslGenCA\fR ~/myCAdir -x11vnc \fB-ssldir\fR ~/myCAdir \fB-sslGenCA\fR -.IP -(the last two lines are equivalent) -.PP -\fB-sslGenCert\fR \fItype\fR \fIname\fR -.IP -Generate a VNC server or client certificate and private -key pair signed by the CA created previously with -\fB-sslGenCA.\fR The -.IR openssl (1) -program must be installed -on the system and available in PATH. -.IP -After the Certificate is generated the command exits; -the VNC server is not run. -.IP -The type of key to be generated is the string \fItype\fR. -It is either "server" (i.e. for use by x11vnc) or -"client" (for a VNC viewer). Note that typically -only "server" is used: the VNC clients authenticate -themselves by a non-public-key method (e.g. VNC or -unix password). \fItype\fR is required. -.IP -An arbitrary default name you want to associate with -the key is supplied by the \fIname\fR string. You can -change it at the various prompts when creating the key. -\fIname\fR is optional. -.IP -If name is left blank for clients keys then "nobody" -is used. If left blank for server keys, then the -primary server key: "server.pem" is created (this -is the saved one referenced by "\fB-ssl\fR \fISAVE\fR" when the -server is started) -.IP -If \fIname\fR begins with the string "self:" then -a self-signed certificate is created instead of one -signed by your CA key. -.IP -If \fIname\fR begins with the string "req:" then only a -key (.key) and a certificate signing *request* (.req) -are generated. You can then send the .req file to -an external CA (even a professional one, e.g. Thawte) -and then combine the .key and the received cert into -the .pem file with the same basename. -.IP -The distinction between "server" and "client" is -simply the choice of output filenames and sub-directory. -This makes it so the \fB-ssl\fR SAVE-name option can easily -pick up the x11vnc PEM file this option generates. -And similarly makes it easy for the \fB-sslverify\fR option -to pick up your client certs. -.IP -There is nothing special about the filename or directory -location of either the "server" and "client" certs. -You can rename the files or move them to wherever -you like. -.IP -Precede this option with \fB-ssldir\fR [dir] to use a -directory other than the default ~/.vnc/certs You will -need to run \fB-sslGenCA\fR on that directory first before -doing any \fB-sslGenCert\fR key creation. -.IP -Note you cannot recreate a cert with exactly the same -distiguished name (DN) as an existing one. To do so, -you will need to edit the [dir]/CA/index.txt file to -delete the line. -.IP -Similar to \fB-sslGenCA,\fR you will be prompted to fill -in some information that will be recorded in the -certificate when it is created. Tip: if you know -the fully-quailified hostname other people will be -connecting to you can use that as the CommonName "CN" -to avoid some applications (e.g. web browsers and java -plugin) complaining it does not match the hostname. -.IP -You will also need to supply the CA private key -passphrase to unlock the private key created from -\fB-sslGenCA.\fR This private key is used to sign the server -or client certicate. -.IP -The "server" certs can be used by x11vnc directly by -pointing to them via the \fB-ssl\fR [pem] option. The default -file will be ~/.vnc/certs/server.pem. This one would -be used by simply typing \fB-ssl\fR SAVE. The pem file -contains both the certificate and the private key. -server.crt file contains the cert only. -.IP -The "client" cert + private key file will need -to be copied and imported into the VNC viewer -side applications (Web browser, Java plugin, -stunnel, etc.) Once that is done you can delete the -"client" private key file on this machine since -it is only needed on the VNC viewer side. The, -e.g. ~/.vnc/certs/clients/<name>.pem contains both -the cert and private key. The <name>.crt contains the -certificate only. -.IP -NOTE: It is very important to know one should always -generate new keys with a passphrase. Otherwise if an -untrusted user steals the key file he could use it to -masquerade as the x11vnc server (or VNC viewer client). -You will be prompted whether to encrypt the key with -a passphrase or not. It is recommended that you do. -One inconvenience to a passphrase is that it must -be suppled every time x11vnc or the client app is -started up. -.IP -Examples: -.IP -x11vnc \fB-sslGenCert\fR server -x11vnc \fB-ssl\fR SAVE \fB-display\fR :0 ... -.IP -and then on viewer using ssl_vncviewer stunnel wrapper -(see the FAQ): -ssl_vncviewer \fB-verify\fR ./cacert.crt hostname:0 -.IP -(this assumes the cacert.crt cert from \fB-sslGenCA\fR -was safely copied to the VNC viewer machine where -ssl_vncviewer is run) -.IP -Example using a name: -.IP -x11vnc \fB-sslGenCert\fR server charlie -x11vnc \fB-ssl\fR SAVE-charlie \fB-display\fR :0 ... -.IP -Example for a client certificate (rarely used): -.IP -x11vnc \fB-sslGenCert\fR client roger -scp ~/.vnc/certs/clients/roger.pem somehost:. -rm ~/.vnc/certs/clients/roger.pem -.IP -x11vnc is then started with the the option \fB-sslverify\fR -~/.vnc/certs/clients/roger.crt (or simply \fB-sslverify\fR -roger), and on the viewer user on somehost could do -for example: -.IP -ssl_vncviewer \fB-mycert\fR ./roger.pem hostname:0 -.PP -\fB-sslEncKey\fR \fI[pem]\fR -.IP -Utility to encrypt an existing PEM file with a -passphrase you supply when prompted. For that key to be -used (e.g. by x11vnc) the passphrase must be supplied -each time. -.IP -The "SAVE" notation described under \fB-ssl\fR applies as -well. (precede this option with \fB-ssldir\fR [dir] to refer -a directory besides the default ~/.vnc/certs) -.IP -The -.IR openssl (1) -program must be installed on the system -and available in PATH. After the Key file is encrypted -the command exits; the VNC server is not run. -.IP -Examples: -x11vnc \fB-sslEncKey\fR /path/to/foo.pem -x11vnc \fB-sslEncKey\fR SAVE -x11vnc \fB-sslEncKey\fR SAVE-charlie -.PP -\fB-sslCertInfo\fR \fI[pem]\fR -.IP -Prints out information about an existing PEM file. -In addition the public certificate is also printed. -The -.IR openssl (1) -program must be in PATH. Basically the -command "openssl x509 \fB-text"\fR is run on the pem. -.IP -The "SAVE" notation described under \fB-ssl\fR applies -as well. -.IP -Using "LIST" will give a list of all certs being -managed (in the ~/.vnc/certs dir, use \fB-ssldir\fR to refer -to another dir). "ALL" will print out the info for -every managed key (this can be very long). Giving a -client or server cert shortname will also try a lookup -(e.g. \fB-sslCertInfo\fR charlie). Use "LISTL" or "LL" -for a long (ls \fB-l\fR style) listing. -.IP -Using "HASHON" will create subdirs [dir]/HASH and -[dir]/HASH with OpenSSL hash filenames (e.g. 0d5fbbf1.0) -symlinks pointing up to the corresponding *.crt file. -([dir] is ~/.vnc/certs or one given by \fB-ssldir.)\fR -This is a useful way for other OpenSSL applications -(e.g. stunnel) to access all of the certs without -having to concatenate them. x11vnc will not use them -unless you specifically reference them. "HASHOFF" -removes these HASH subdirs. -.IP -The LIST, LISTL, LL, ALL, HASHON, HASHOFF words can -also be lowercase, e.g. "list". -.PP -\fB-sslDelCert\fR \fI[pem]\fR -.IP -Prompts you to delete all .crt .pem .key .req files -associated with [pem]. "SAVE" and lookups as in -\fB-sslCertInfo\fR apply as well. -.PP -\fB-stunnel\fR \fI[pem]\fR -.IP -Use the -.IR stunnel (8) -(www.stunnel.org) to provide an -encrypted SSL tunnel between viewers and x11vnc. -.IP -This external tunnel method was implemented prior to the -integrated \fB-ssl\fR encryption described above. It still -works well. This requires stunnel to be installed -on the system and available via PATH (n.b. stunnel is -often installed in sbin directories). Version 4.x of -stunnel is assumed (but see \fB-stunnel3\fR below.) -.IP -[pem] is optional, use "\fB-stunnel\fR \fI/path/to/stunnel.pem\fR" -to specify a PEM certificate file to pass to stunnel. -Whether one is needed or not depends on your stunnel -configuration. stunnel often generates one at install -time. See the stunnel documentation for details. -.IP -stunnel is started up as a child process of x11vnc and -any SSL connections stunnel receives are decrypted and -sent to x11vnc over a local socket. The strings -"The SSL VNC desktop is ..." and "SSLPORT=..." -are printed out at startup to indicate this. -.IP -The \fB-localhost\fR option is enforced by default -to avoid people routing around the SSL channel. -Set STUNNEL_DISABLE_LOCALHOST=1 before starting x11vnc -to disable the requirement. -.IP -Your VNC viewer will also need to be able to connect via -SSL. Unfortunately not too many do this. UltraVNC has -an encryption plugin but it does not seem to be SSL. -.IP -Also, in the x11vnc distribution, a patched TightVNC -Java applet is provided in classes/ssl that does SSL -connections (only). -.IP -It is also not too difficult to set up an stunnel or -other SSL tunnel on the viewer side. A simple example -on Unix using stunnel 3.x is: -.IP -% stunnel \fB-c\fR \fB-d\fR localhost:5901 \fB-r\fR remotehost:5900 -% vncviewer localhost:1 -.IP -For Windows, stunnel has been ported to it and there -are probably other such tools available. See the FAQ -for more examples. -.PP -\fB-stunnel3\fR \fI[pem]\fR -.IP -Use version 3.x stunnel command line syntax instead of -version 4.x -.PP -\fB-https\fR \fI[port]\fR -.IP -Choose a separate HTTPS port (-ssl mode only). -.IP -In \fB-ssl\fR mode, it turns out you can use the -single VNC port (e.g. 5900) for both VNC and HTTPS -connections. (HTTPS is used to retrieve a SSL-aware -VncViewer.jar applet that is provided with x11vnc). -Since both use SSL the implementation was extended to -detect if HTTP traffic (i.e. GET) is taking place and -handle it accordingly. The URL would be, e.g.: -.IP -https://mymachine.org:5900/ -.IP -This is convenient for firewalls, etc, because only one -port needs to be allowed in. However, this heuristic -adds a few seconds delay to each connection and can be -unreliable (especially if the user takes much time to -ponder the Certificate dialogs in his browser, Java VM, -or VNC Viewer applet. That's right 3 separate "Are -you sure you want to connect" dialogs!) -.IP -So use the \fB-https\fR option to provide a separate, more -reliable HTTPS port that x11vnc will listen on. If -[port] is not provided (or is 0), one is autoselected. -The URL to use is printed out at startup. -.IP -The SSL Java applet directory is specified via the -\fB-httpdir\fR option. If not supplied it will try to guess -the directory as though the \fB-http\fR option was supplied. -.PP \fB-usepw\fR .IP If no other password method was supplied on the command @@ -1214,9 +524,6 @@ use it with \fB-passwdfile;\fR otherwise, prompt the user for a password to create ~/.vnc/passwd and use it with the \fB-rfbauth\fR option. If none of these succeed x11vnc exits immediately. -.IP -Note: \fB-unixpw\fR currently does not count as a password -method by this option. .PP \fB-storepasswd\fR \fIpass\fR \fIfile\fR .IP @@ -1600,6 +907,39 @@ e.g. !, @, [, are only accessible via \fB-xkb\fR mode and if so then automatically enable the mode. To disable this automatic detection use \fB-noxkb.\fR .PP +\fB-capslock\fR +.IP +When in \fB-modtweak\fR (the default) or \fB-xkb\fR mode, +if a keysym in the range A-Z comes in check the X +server to see if the Caps_Lock is set. If it is do +not artificially press Shift to generate the keysym. +This will enable the CapsLock key to behave correctly +in some circumstances: namely *both* the VNC viewer +machine and the x11vnc X server are in the CapsLock +on state. If one side has CapsLock on and the other +off and the keyboard is not behaving as you think it +should you should correct the CapsLock states (hint: +pressing CapsLock inside and outside of the viewer can +help toggle them both to the correct state). However, +for best results do not use this option, but rather +*only* enable CapsLock on the VNC viewer side (i.e. by +pressing CapsLock outside of the viewer window, also +\fB-skip_lockkeys\fR below). Also try \fB-nomodtweak\fR for a +possible workaround. +.PP +\fB-skip_lockkeys\fR +.IP +Have x11vnc ignore all Caps_Lock, Shift_Lock, Num_Lock, +Scroll_Lock keysyms received from viewers. The idea is +you press Caps_Lock on the VNC Viewer side but that does +not change the lock state in the x11vnc-side X server. +Nevertheless your capitalized letters come in over +the wire and are applied correctly to the x11vnc-side +X server. Note this mode probably won't do what you +want in \fB-nomodtweak\fR mode. Also, a kludge for KP_n +digits is always done it this mode: they are mapped to +regular digit keysyms. See also \fB-capslock\fR above. +.PP \fB-skip_keycodes\fR \fIstring\fR .IP Ignore the comma separated list of decimal keycodes. @@ -1667,6 +1007,9 @@ To map a key to a button click, use the fake Keysyms "Button1", ..., etc. E.g: "\fB-remap\fR \fISuper_R-Button2\fR" (useful for pasting on a laptop) .IP +To disable a keysym (i.e. make it so it will not be +injected), remap it to "NoSymbol" or "None". +.IP Dead keys: "dead" (or silent, mute) keys are keys that do not produce a character but must be followed by a 2nd keystroke. This is often used for accenting characters, @@ -2848,6 +2191,10 @@ Up and Down arrows adjust the station (if a tuner) F1, F2, ..., F6 will switch the video capture pixel format to HI240, RGB565, RGB24, RGB32, RGB555, and GREY respectively. See \fB-rawfb\fR video for details. +.IP +If cmd is "CONS" or "CONSn" where n is a Linux +console number, then the linux console keystroke +insertion (see \fB-rawfb\fR cons) is performed. .PP \fB-gui\fR \fI[gui-opts]\fR .IP @@ -3165,6 +2512,14 @@ xkb enable \fB-xkb\fR modtweak mode. .IP noxkb disable \fB-xkb\fR modtweak mode. .IP +capslock enable \fB-capslock\fR mode. +.IP +nocapslock disable \fB-capslock\fR mode. +.IP +skip_lockkeys enable \fB-skip_lockkeys\fR mode. +.IP +noskip_lockkeys disable \fB-skip_lockkeys\fR mode. +.IP skip_keycodes:str enable \fB-xkb\fR \fB-skip_keycodes\fR "str". .IP sloppy_keys enable \fB-sloppy_keys\fR mode. @@ -3502,8 +2857,9 @@ unlock connect allowonce allow localhost nolocalhost listen lookup nolookup accept afteraccept gone shm noshm flipbyteorder noflipbyteorder onetile noonetile solid_color solid nosolid blackout xinerama noxinerama -xtrap noxtrap xrandr noxrandr xrandr_mode padgeom quiet -q noquiet modtweak nomodtweak xkb noxkb skip_keycodes +xtrap noxtrap xrandr noxrandr xrandr_mode padgeom +quiet q noquiet modtweak nomodtweak xkb noxkb capslock +nocapslock skip_lockkeys noskip_lockkeys skip_keycodes sloppy_keys nosloppy_keys skip_dups noskip_dups add_keysyms noadd_keysyms clear_mods noclear_mods clear_keys noclear_keys remap repeat norepeat fb nofb @@ -3541,8 +2897,7 @@ http_url auth xauth users rootshift clipshift scale_str scaled_x scaled_y scale_numer scale_denom scale_fac scaling_blend scaling_nomult4 scaling_pad scaling_interpolate inetd privremote unsafe safer nocmds -passwdfile unixpw unixpw_nis unixpw_list ssl ssl_pem -sslverify stunnel stunnel_pem https usepw using_shm +passwdfile usepw using_shm logfile o flag rc norc h help V version lastmod bg sigpipe threads readrate netrate netlatency pipeinput clients client_count pid ext_xtest ext_xtrap ext_xrecord @@ -3658,6 +3013,14 @@ max time in ms to wait for RFB client use authentication on RFB protocol (use 'storepasswd' to create a password file) .PP +\fB-rfbversion\fR \fI3.x\fR +.IP +Set the version of the RFB we choose to advertise +.PP +\fB-permitfiletransfer\fR +.IP +permit file transfer support +.PP \fB-passwd\fR \fIplain-password\fR .IP use authentication |